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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to investigate the irrationality in decision making on risk attitude. More concretely, the likelihood of 
reflection effect in decision making was investigated and compared between two conditions (the reflection effect from the risk 
seeking choice to the risk aversive choice and that from the risk aversive choice to the risk seeking choice). Second, the condition 
(p-value (probability of gain or loss) in for the reversal of choice (change of risk attitude) was identified and compared between 
gain and loss domains. In such a way, the irrational property in decision making on risk attitude was pointed out. On the basis of 
such an approach, it was discussed how decision making on choosing one of the two prospects (A) ($Y, p) and (B) ($X,1) should 
be systematically treated in order to generalize the behavior of changing risk attitude under the condition of a smaller value of p 
and  (Y is by far larger than X). Moreover, it was also pointed out that the derivation of the property of weighting function in 
prospect theory   using a simple demonstrative decision making paradigm cannot be generalized and is not proper for verifying 
and deriving this property. The results were as follows: (1) While the reflective effect from the risk seeking choice to the risk 
aversive choice readily occurred when the occurrence probability of the larger gain was low, the reflective effect from the risk 
aversive choice to the risk seeking choice was unlikely and didn’t readily occur. (2) The larger change (increment or decrement) 
of p-value was necessary to change the risk attitude (from risk aversive to risk seeking, and vice versa) in the loss domain than in 
the gain domain. (3) Only Equations (2) and (4) are insufficient for the generalization of characteristics of the weighting function.  
(4) For the systematical generalization of the change of risk attitude, the characteristics of the following prospects must be 
explored in more detail: Prospect (A) ($Y,p) and Prospect (B) ($X,1), where p is a smaller probability, and (Y is by far larger than 
X). 
 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference. 
Keywords: Behavioral economics; Prospect theory; Reflection effect; Irrationality; Change of risk attitude  
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +81-86-251-8055; fax: +81-86-251-8055. 
E-mail address: murata@iims.sys.okayama-u.ac.jp  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of AHFE Conference
4161 Atsuo Murata et al. /  Procedia Manufacturing  3 ( 2015 )  4160 – 4167 
1. Introduction 
Kahneman and Tversky [1] used the following questionnaire on risk attitude in order to verify that the value of 
probability weighting function (π(p)) gets larger than the actual probability p.  
Problem1 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Get $5000 with the probability of 0.001 ((A) = ($5000, 0.001)). 
(B) Get $5 for sure ((B) = ($5, 1)). 
Problem3 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Lose $5000 with the probability of 0.001 ((A) = (-$5000, 0.001)). 
(B) Lose $5 for sure ((B) = (-$5, 1)). 
 
However, the two decision making situation above are insufficient for the generalization of characteristics of the 
weighting function π(p) ؤ p for smaller p values. It has been shown that the reflection effect, that is, the reversal of 
risk attitude between gain and loss domains, is observable [2],[3]. However, it has not been clarified whether the 
likelihood of occurrence of reflection effect in decision making is different between the change of risk attitude from 
the risk seeking choice to the risk aversive choice and vice versa. The change of p-value necessary for changing the 
risk attitude (from risk aversive to risk seeking, and vice versa) has also not been explored in both loss domain and 
gain domains. In other words, the condition under which the risk attitude changes from risk aversive to risk seeking, 
and vice versa has not been systematically identified. Risk attitude changes in decision making between two 
prospects ($Y, p) and ($X,1) under a smaller p-value and Y>>X must be examined systematically in order to get 
insight into irrational properties of change of risk attitude from risk aversive to risk seeking, and vice versa. 
Moreover, what is lacking in generalizing the characteristics of the weighting function π(p)ؤp must be made clear to 
enhance the applicability of prospect theory [4]-[7] to a variety of decision making situations.   
The aim of this study was conducted to investigate the irrationality in decision making on risk attitude. More 
concretely, the likelihood of reflection effect in decision making was investigated and compared between two 
conditions (the reflection effect from the risk seeking choice to the risk aversive choice and vice versa). Second, it 
was discussed under what condition the reflection effect can be observed, and the condition (p-value (probability of 
gain or loss) in the risk seeking choice) for the reversal of choice (change of risk attitude) was identified and 
compared between gain and loss domains. In such a way, the irrational property in decision making on risk attitude 
was pointed out.  
On the basis of such an approach, it was discussed how decision making on choosing one of the two prospects 
(A) ($Y, p) and (B) ($X,1) should be systematically treated in order to generalize the behavior of changing risk 
attitude under the condition of a smaller value of p and Y>>X (Y is by far larger than X). Moreover, we made an 
attempt to point out that the derivation of the property of weighting function in prospect theory π(p)>p using a 
simple demonstrative decision making paradigm cannot be generalized and is not proper for verifying and deriving 
this property.  
In short, the following three issues were investigated in this study:  
 
1. It was investigated whether the likelihood of occurrence of reflective effect differed between the change from the 
risk seeking choice to the risk aversive choice and vice versa. 
2. We investigated the change of p-value necessary for changing the risk attitude (from risk aversive to risk seeking, 
and vice versa) in both loss domain and gain domains.  
3. It was examined whether the above two decision making situation is sufficient for the generalization of 
characteristics of the weighting function π(p)>p for smaller p values. 
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty one undergraduate or graduate students aged from 20 to 26 years old took part in the experiment. All had 
no knowledge or skill in psychology or behavioral economics. All agreed with the participation in the experiment 
after receiving a brief explanation of the aim and the contents of the experiment. 
2.2. Experimental task 
First, the participant was required to answer Problem1 below. 
Problem1 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Get $5000 with the probability of 0.001. 
(B) Get $5 for sure. 
 
The participants who chose (B) were required to answer Problem2-a below. The participant was required to enter 
the probability p at which he or she changed the decision from (B) to (A). The following discrete p values were used 
in the experiment: 0.00001%, 0.00002%, 0.00005%, 0.0001%, 0.0002%, 0.0005%, 0.001%, 0.002%, 0.005%, 
0.008%, 0.01%, 0.02%, 0.03%, 0.04%, 0.05%, 0.06%, 0.07%, 0.08%, and 0.09%.  
Problem2-a 
You chose option (B) in Problem1. At which probability of getting $50000 do you change your decision to (A)?  
 
The participants who chose (A) in Problem1 were also required to answer Problem2-b below. The participant was 
required to enter the probability p at which he or she changed the decision from (B) to (A). The following discrete p 
values were used in the experiment: 0.1%, 0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 
30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
Problem2-b 
Assume that you select option (A) in Problem1. At which probability of getting $50000 do you change your 
decision to (B)? 
   
These problems (Problem2-a) and (Problem2-b) correspond to the problem related to the gain situation. 
Next, the participant was required to answer Problem3 below. 
Problem3 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Lose $5000 with the probability of 0.001. 
(B) Lose $5 for sure. 
 
The participants who chose (A) in Problem3 were required to answer Problem4-a below (see Fig. 1(a)). The 
participant was required to answer the probability p at which he or she changed the decision from (B) to (A) using 
an upward or downward arrow in Fig. 1(b). The following discrete p values were used in the experiment: 0.1%, 
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0.5%, 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, 9%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 35%, 40%, 45%, 50%, 55%, 60%, 
65%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, 90%, 95%, and 99%.  
Problem4-a 
Assume that you select option (A) in Problem3. At which probability of getting $50000 do you change your 
decision to (B)?  
 
The participants who chose (B) in Problem3 were required to answer Problem4-b below. The following discrete p 
values were used in the experiment: 0.00001%, 0.00002%, 0.00005%, 0.0001%, 0.0002%, 0.0005%, 0.001%, 
0.002%, 0.005%, 0.008%, 0.01%, 0.02%, 0.03%, 0.04%, 0.05%, 0.06%, 0.07%, 0.08%, and 0.09%. 
Problem4-b 
Assume that you select option (B) in Problem1. At which probability of getting $50000 do you change your 
decision to (A)?   
 
In this study, it was explored how the reversal of preference occurs with the change of p. In other words, by 
identifying the value of p at which the preference (choice) was reversed, we examined the condition under which the 
reflection effect was observed.  
The contents of the experiment were explained to the participant. The participant was required to answer 
Problem1, Problem2-a or 2-b, Problem3, and Problem4-a or 4-b in this order. The meanings of value function and p-
value in prospect theory were not explained to the participants at all.  
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Fig. 1. (a) Relationship between gain and value function v in Problem1. A concave function v is assumed in the gain domain; (b) Relationship 
between gain and value function v in Problem3. A convex function v is assumed in the loss domain. 
3. Results 
3.1. Percentage of choices for each alternatives and reversal of choice 
In the gain domain, about 66.7% of the participants (14 out of 21 participants) made decision to chose the risk 
seeking alternative (A) Get $5000 with the probability of 0.001(0.1%). About 33.3% of the participants chose (B) 
Get $5 for sure in the gain area.  
In the loss domain, about 14.3% of the participants (3 out of 21) chose (A) Lose $5000 with the probability of 
0.001. About 85.7% of the participants made decision to chose the risk aversive alternative (B) Lose $5 for sure. 
The percentage of reversal of choice between Problem1 and Problem3 was as follows. About 85.7% of the 
participants who chose (A) in Problem1 (risk seeking) chose (B) in Problem3 (risk aversive). The reversal of choice 
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(reflection effect) occurred for about 85.7% of the participants. For the participants who chose a risk aversive 
alternative (B) in Problem1, the reversal of choice occurred for only one participant (16.7%). In other words, six out 
of seven participants who chose a risk aversive alternative (B) in Problem1 chose a risk aversive alternative (B) in 
Problem3 (The reversal of choice did not occur). In such a way, the reversal of choice (reflection effect) was more 
frequently observed for the participants who chose a risk seeking alternative (A) in Problem1 than for the 
participants who chose a risk aversive alternative (B) in Problem1. 
3.2. P-value when the shift from (A) to (B) or from (B) to (A) occurs in gain domain (Problem1) 
For the participants who chose (A), the mean value of probability p at which the decision changed from (A) to 
(B) Get $5 for sure was found to be 0.00014 (0.014%) (range: from 0.00001% to 0.05%). 
For the participants who chose (B), the mean value of probability p at which the decision changed from (B) to 
(A) Get $5000 with the probability of p was found to be 0.091(9.1 %) (range: from 0.5% to 50%). 
3.3. P-value when the shift from (A) to (B) or from (B) to (A) occurs in loss domain (Problem2) 
For the participants who chose (A), the mean value of probability p at which the decision changed from (A) to 
(B) Lose $5 for sure was found to be 0.0279 (2.79 %) (range: from 0.5% to 10%).  
For the participants who chose (B), the mean value of probability p at which the decision changed from (B) to 
(A) Lose $5000 with the probability of p was found to be 0.00008 (0.008%) (range: from 0.00001 % to 0.05 %). 
4. Discussion 
4.1. Reversal of choice (reflection effect) 
The reversal of choice (reflection effect) was clearly observed for about 85.7% of the participants who chose (A) 
in Problem1 (risk seeking). They chose (B) in Problem3 (risk aversive), and the attitude toward the risk was 
different between the gain and the loss domain. For the seven participants who chose a risk aversive alternative (B) 
in Problem1, the reflection effect was observed for only one participant. Six out of seven participants chose a risk 
aversive alternative (B) even in Problem3.   
In such a way, the reversal of choice (reflection effect) was more frequently observed for the participants who 
chose a risk seeking alternative (A) in Problem1 than for the participants who chose a risk aversive alternative (B) in 
Problem1. This means that the reflective effect from the risk seeking choice ((A) in Problem1) to the risk aversive 
choice ((B) in Probmlem3) readily occurs when the occurrence probability of the larger gain is low. On the other 
hand, as for the participants who chose a risk aversive alternative (B) in Problem1, a reflective effect was observed 
for only one participant, which means that the reflective effect from the risk aversive choice to the risk seeking 
choice is unlikely and doesn’t readily occur. 
4.2. P-value when the shift from (A) to (B) or from (B) to (A) occurs in both gain and loss domains 
Kahneman and Tversky [1], assuming a concave function in the gain domain, showed that the following 
relationships hold on the basis of the questionnaire survey using Problem1 above (see Fig. 1(a)). Here, v(x) and π(x) 
represent the value function and the weighting function, respectively. 
䚷䚷)5()5000()001.0( vv !S    (1) 
䚷001.0
)5000(
)5()001.0( !!
v
vS    (2) 
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The inequality above doesn’t mean that the relationship (1) or (2) universally holds. In Kahneman and Tversky 
[1], about 72 % of the participants selected (A) in Problem1. For about 28% of the participants, Eq.(1) or (2) did not 
hold.  
Similarly, the following relationships hold by assuming a convex function in the loss domain on the basis of the 
questionnaire survey in Problem3 (see Fig. 1(b)). 
䚷䚷䚷)5()5000()001.0(  vvS    (3) 
䚷䚷䚷001.0
)5000(
)5()001.0( !
!
v
vS    (4) 
Although Kahneman and Tversky [1] seemed to conclude that the following relationship is satisfied on the basis of 
the relationship above, it cannot be assured that the relationship generally holds on the basis of the derivation above. 
䚷䚷䚷)( pp !S    (5) 
Problem1 and Problem3 are expressed more generally as follows. It must be noted that p is a small value. 
Problem1* 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Get $Y with the probability of p*. 
(B) Get $X for sure. 
Problem3* 
Which do you choose? 
(A) Lose $Y with the probability of p*. 
(B) Lose $X for sure. 
 
When (A) in Problem1* is preferred to (B) in Problem1*, the following inequality holds (see Fig. 2). 
䚷䚷
)(
)(*)(
Y
X
Yv
Xvp !!S    (6) 
When (B) in Problem3* is preferred to (A) in Problem3*, the following inequality is satisfied. 
䚷䚷
)(
)(*)(
Y
X
Yv
Xvp !
!S    (7) 
The relationships in (6) and (7) do not necessarily means that the relationship (5) holds. It is, generally, 
impossible to conclude and determine whether X/Y is larger than p* or not. As X is equal to p*Y in Problem1 and 
Problem2, it happens that Eq.(5) holds in such cases. However, only such cases (Eqs.(2) and (4))are not enough to 
demonstrate that Eq.(5) generally holds. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the relationship between p and X/Y in 
more detail in order to investigate the characteristics of weighting function   and the attitude change toward risk 
under the condition of low p value and Y>>X (>> represents that Y is by far larger than X).  
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The empirical and more indirect verification of Eq.(5) by the identification of the relationship between the 
number of deaths and the predicted number of deaths for a variety of diseases and accidents [8],[9] would be more 
generalized to verify Eq.(5) empirically.  
On the basis of the results in this study, the change of risk attitude is mentioned.  First, the p-value when the 
choice shift from (A) to (B) and from (B) to (A) in the gain domain is discussed. On average, the shift from choice 
(A) to choice (B) occurred when p-value decreased from 0.1% to 0.014%. The p-value of 0.014% may be expressed 
as a value that makes the participant abandon the risk seeking alternative and get risk aversive. The expected value 
of the risk seeking alternative corresponds to about $0.7 (=$5000X0.00014), and is by far smaller than $5 for sure 
gain. This means that the participants do not necessarily judge rationally on the basis of the mathematical expected 
value and make decision using the calculated expected value. This situation can be expressed as follows. 
䚷䚷䚷)5()5000()00014.0( vv S    (8) 
The p-value (0.014%) was about 1/7.14 of the initial p-value of 0.1%.  
On average, the shift from choice (B) to choice (A) occurred when p-value increased from 0.1% to 9.1%. The 
expected value of the risk seeking alternative corresponds to about $455 (=$5000X0.091), and is by far larger than 
$5 for sure gain. This also means that the participants do not necessarily judge rationally on the basis of the 
mathematical expected value and make decision using the calculated expected value. The irrational change behavior 
of risk attitude lies in this result.  This situation can be expressed as follows. 
䚷䚷䚷)5()5000()091.0( vv !S    (9) 
The p-value (9.1%) was about 9.1 times of the initial p-value of 0.1%.  
Next, the p-value when the choice shift from (A) to (B) and from (B) to (A) in the loss domain is mentioned. On 
average, the shift from choice (A) to choice (B) occurred when p-value increased from 0.1% to 2.79%. The expected 
value of the risk seeking alternative corresponds to about -$139.5(=-$5000X0.0279=-$139.5), and is by far smaller 
than -$5 for sure loss. The participants did not necessarily judge rationally on the basis of the mathematical expected 
value and make decision using the calculated expected value. If the participants made decision rationally, they must 
have changed their attitude to the risk aversive one for smaller p-value than this. The irrational behavior of risk 
attitude can be observed in this result. This situation can be expressed as follows. 
䚷䚷䚷)5()5000()0279.0(  vvS    (10) 
The p-value (2.79%) was about 27.9 times of the initial p-value of 0.1%.  
On average, the shift from choice (B) to choice (A) occurred when p-value decreased from 0.1% to 0.008%. The 
expected value of the risk seeking alternative corresponds to about -$0.4(=-$5000X0.00008=-$0.4), and is by far 
larger than -$5 for sure loss. If the participants tend to make decision rationally on the basis of the calculated 
expected value, they must have changed their attitude to the risk seeking one for larger value of p than this. This 
situation can be expressed as follows. 
䚷䚷䚷)5()5000()00008.0( ! vvS    (11) 
The p-value (0.008%) was about 1/12.5 of the initial p-value of 0.1%.  
As a whole, the result shows that the change of risk attitude from risk aversive to risk seeking or from risk 
seeking to risk aversive is carried out on the basis of the irrational decision. Moreover, in the range of this 
experiment, it seems that changing the risk attitude (from risk aversive to risk seeking, and vice versa) in the loss 
domain needs the larger change (increment or decrement) of p-value than that in the gain domain. 
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Fig. 2. Relationship between gain and value function v in more generalized Problem1* in the gain domain. Here, Y>>X (Y is by far larger than X), 
and x >y. A concave function v is assumed in the gain domain. 
5. Conclusions 
This study made an attempt to investigate the irrationality in decision making on risk attitude. The likelihood of 
reflection effect in such decision making was compared between two conditions (the change from the risk seeking 
choice to the risk aversive choice and vice versa). Second, the p-value (probability of gain or loss) that led to the 
reversal of choice (change of risk attitude) was identified and compared between gain and loss domains. In such a 
way, the irrational property of the participants in decision making on risk attitude was pointed out.  
On the basis of the experimental results, it was discussed how decision making on choosing one of the two 
prospects (A) ($Y, p) and (B) ($X,1) should be systematically treated in order to generalize the irrational behavior of 
changing risk attitude under the condition of a smaller p and Y>>X . Moreover, we also showed that the derivation 
of the property of weighting function in prospect theory π(p)>p using a simple demonstrative decision making 
paradigm in Kahneman and Tversky [1] cannot be generalized and is not proper for verifying and deriving this 
property. The results can be summarized as follows: 
 
1. The reflective effect from the risk seeking choice to the risk aversive choice readily occurs when the occurrence 
probability of the larger gain is low.  
2. The reflective effect from the risk aversive choice to the risk seeking choice is unlikely and doesn’t readily 
occur. 
3. The larger change of p-value from the initial value is necessary to make the participants change the risk attitude 
(from risk aversive to risk seeking, and vice versa) in the loss domain than in the gain domain.  
4. Only Eqs.(2) and (4) above proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) are insufficient for the generalization of 
characteristics of the weighting function π(p)>p. The systematical generalization of the change of risk attitude 
needs the detailed exploration of the characteristics of the following more general prospects. Prospect (A) 
($Y,p) and Prospect (B) ($X,1), where p is a smaller probability, and  Y>>X. 
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